Volumul 16 (2020)

Doctrina lui Kant a fost şi mai este încă prezentă în viaţa filosofică mondială. Ea continuă să exercite o influenţă apreciabilă în gândirea teoretică contemporană, atât prin adaptarea ideilor kantiene, izvorâte din practica ştiinţifică a veacului al XVIII-lea, la noile condiţii tehnico-ştiinţifice – adaptare care a dus de multe ori la exagerări, dar care reprezintă totuşi un pilon solid al raţionalismului, o perpetuă sursă de argumente contra tendinţelor neopozitiviste şi neoplatonice –, cât şi prin contribuţiile remarcabile (în logică, teoria cunoaşterii, epistemologie, filosofia istoriei şi teoria culturii) ale unora dintre reprezentanţii mai vechi şi mai noi ai mişcării kantiene.

This essay analyses aspects of Professor Nicolae Bagdasar’s perspective and interpretation of Vasile Conta’s personality and philosophical work. Our point of view is based on the fact that, despite the common practice, the interpreter goes beyond the intellectual framework of the actual presentation by entering the affective-emotional sphere, and presenting, towards the end of his essay, a counterfactual hypothesis of the kind “What if…?” It is this very process that makes the debate very interesting, because it gives us the opportunity to recall the paramount sequences of Conta’s intellectual biography, in opposing contrast with that of the illustrious philosopher J. G. Fichte. Based on the results of this excursus we subsequently propose considerations about the relationship between will, vocation and cultural values in V. Conta’s philosophical work. Therefore, we conclude that although Conta was criticized by Bagdasar for his materialistic views, which were limiting his approach to the philosophical truth, he remains, first and foremost, a cultural role model (praised by the same author) by taking full responsibility for his vocation during a short but very productive life.

Vasile Băncilă left us two writings on Schopenhauer. One of them represented his second undergraduate thesis (evaluated by G. Antonescu and Mircea Florianl), and the other, a much more extensive typewritten text which he presumably intended to present as a doctoral thesis in philosophy. The following article deals with Băncilă’s analysis of Schopen­hauer’s work.

The first part of the paper offers an overall and detailed survey of the reception and image of yoga in various types of Romanian dictionaries (linguistic, encyclopedic, specialized, etc.), while the second part is reserved for a special discussion of the dictionaries devoted to religion during the Communist era.
Three words, with their derivates, have been taken into consideration: “fakir” (“fakirism”, “fakiric”, “fakiristic”, etc.), “yoga” (“yogism”, “yogistic”, “yogin”/ “yogist”, etc.), and “tantra” (“tantrism”, “tantric”, “tantrist”, etc.). The timeframe covers the 20^th century till the end of 1989, with incursions before (for “fakir”, etc.) and after (for “yoga”, “tantra”, etc.) this period.
The survey offers ample material for a discussion on influences between diction­aries and cases of intertextuality, as well as on the impact of political contexts on understanding yoga and the interpretative patterns which survive political eras.

The article starts with a short presentation of the distinction between the traditional substantialist paradigm and the present-day functionalist one to which both thinkers belong. Then a few of their fundamental concepts are discussed through the lenses of their functionalist approach.

The study brings forth Dimitrie C. Nădejde’s writings on ethical subjects from the beginning of the 20^th century. The author shows Nădejde based his ethics on a field under development at the time: psychology, seen as an indispensable method for the causal explanation of the basis of ethical values. The author also shows that by taking into account all the knowledge psychology provides, Nădejde was con­vinced one can attenuate the formal and critical, as well as abstract and prescriptive, traits of the categorical imperative. In his view, psychology, applied to the field of morals, is able to relax the rigorousness and rigidity imposed by such an imperative. But he also underlined that morals would have no meaning, no matter how strong the contribution of psychology in restricting the Kant-type rigorousness, if we were to cut down determining morality only to our blind and unbridled impulses. Therefore, in order to construct morals as an independent science, he argues that one needs to join the contribution of logics with psychology because, in its essence, moral conduct as object of ethics also involves moral thinking and sensitivity (which involves explaining moral actions with the help of the notion of psycho-social facts).

Nae Ionescu’s project of metaphysics is centred on the category of being besides other fundamental concepts, ontological as well as epistemological, all of them receiving meaning through the concept of freedom as personal experience. According to the Romanian philosopher, being cannot be defined in a classical, logical-categorical manner but only starting from a fact of living. Nae Ionescu’s metaphysics is an anthropological project: human being is seen as a whole that can reach its fulfilment by knowledge and action in a real community.

In this paper we present and discuss the main Romanian attempts in philosophical psychology in the first decades of the 19^th century, with a special focus on the mind–body problem. Whereas the issue of the relationship between the mind or soul and the body, comprising the existence or inexistence of the soul, its materiality or immateriality, its mortality or immortality etc. is discussed in sufficient detail by the authors of this epoch, the narrow mind–body problem, concerning the difficulty for a material thing and an immaterial thing to causally interact, is curiously underestimated and unsatisfactorily treated. We explain this by the interplay of a sensualist philo­sophical outlook and a pre-modern, basically religion-informed, world-view. The re­sult­ing thought, we argue, misses the modern concept of Spirit, hence of mind as spiritual. Therefore, the narrow mind–body problem does not arise for it.

Titu Maiorescu had a special relationship with psychology under the influence of both Kant and Herbart. The following study presents Maiorescu’s answers to the main issues raised by the materialism controversy that broke out in Germany in the mid-1850s century, at a time when he was writing and defending his doctoral thesis in Giessen. Most of these issues were related to the mind–body liaison and the capa­bility of science to explain the mind.

The following article focuses on revealing a number of very specific points of agreement between three outstanding Romanian philosophers (Vasile Conta, C. Rădulescu-Motru and Mircea Florian). Their main shared views are related to the mind–body relationship, to which they separately found similar solutions from their respective philosophical stances.

Cele patru articole reprezentând polemica dintre Ioan Petrovici și G. Bogdan-Duică pe marginea tezei de doctorat a celui dintâi au fost preluate din Revista generală a învă­țământului, după cum urmează: (1) G. Bogdan-Duică, „Întâia teză română pentru doctorat în filosofie”, în Revista generală a învățământului, anul I, nr. 5, 1 decembrie 1905, pp. 322–325; (2) Ioan Petrovici, „Spirit și corp (I)”, în Revista generală a învățământului, anul I, nr. 8, martie 1906, pp. 599–604; (3) Ioan Petrovici, „Spirit și corp (II)”, în Revista generală a învățământului, anul I, nr. 9, 1 aprilie 1906, pp. 692–699; (4) G. Bogdan Duică, „Întâia teză română pentru doctorat în filosofie (Cuvântul din urmă)”, în Revista generală a în­vățământului, anul I, nr. 10, mai 1906, pp. 779–786.Textele au fost actualizate la nivel ortografic și de punctu­ație. Forme precum „fisiologie”, „metafisică”, „deslegare”, „totuș”, „iarăș”, „a eși” au devenit „fiziologie”, „me­ta­­fizică”, „dezlegare”, „totuși”, „iarăși”, „a ieși”. Au fost conservate in­tegral parti­cularitățile lingvistice ale epocii și autorilor, inclusiv articolul posesiv invariabil „a”, conjugările verbale și formele vechi ale unor nume proprii (Galile pentru Galilei sau Aristot pentru Aristotel). Greșelile de tipar au fost corectate tacit.Am păstrat, de asemenea, forma originală de prezentare a notelor de subsol (inclusiv numerotarea). Intervențiile edi­torilor se regăsesc între paranteze pătrate, iar notele editorilor sunt semnalate prin „*”.  
[MONA MAMULEA; TITUS LATES]

Notă introductivă [Mona Mamulea] p. 183
Notă asupra ediției [Mona Mamulea și Titus Lates] p. 185
G. Bogdan-Duică, Întâia teză română pentru doctorat în filosofie p. 187
Ioan Petrovici, Spirit și corp (I) p. 191
Ioan Petrovici, Spirit și corp (II) p. 196
G. Bogdan Duică, Întâia teză română pentru doctorat în filosofie (Cuvântul din urmă) p. 202