Volume 18 (2022)

In the following paper, I suggest an interpretation of Petrovici’s and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, both of them structured in accordance with the concept of unity of existence (the world), itself given in a close relation with the idea about an existential subject. Each philosophy includes a representation of the unity of existence, founded, the first, in a spiritual conviction (noetic belief), and the second, in a perceptual faith. This representation is in the same time a privileged kind by which a subject enters the world. Also, I will suggest arguments in order to legitimate the idea that each representation and its construction let themselves be led by the regulativity of a model of philosophizing: the philosophy of life (in the context of a metaphysics) – Petrovici; the existential philosophy (in a phenomenological context) – Merleau-Ponty.

Constantin Leonardescu (1844–1907) was a professor of philosophy for 34 years at the University of Iași. He was an adept of the French eclectic spiritualism, which he tried to reconcile with the positivism of Herbert Spencer and with the Darwinism of Ernst Haeckel, while countering Vasile Conta’s brand of scientific materialism. Leonardescu argued against the positivist tenet of the incompatibility of metaphysics and positive science, based on the emergence of new “partial” or “local” metaphysics in the thought of contemporary genuine scientists, who philosophized disregarding the former metaphysical tradition, using only the concepts of their own disciplines and forging their own principles. Positive metaphysics exists thus potentially, the metaphysician’s task being to systematize, or to “reconcile” the local contributions of the scientists-philosophers in the framework of a general, unifying theory. This framework, he argues, is a generalization of “Darwinism”, that is, of the special metaphysics initiated by Darwin, then rendered general by Spencer and most importantly by Haeckel. However, philosophical Darwinism or “evolutionary monism” curiously vindicates, in Leonardescu’s view, traditional spiritualism. Generalized Darwinism thus interpreted offered a fundamental theory in which science could achieve systematic unity and become a true mirror of the Totality, which is metaphysics’ true object. Scientific metaphysics is principally a reflection upon science, taking as starting point the positive facts recognized as such by the sciences, and the empirical generalizations validated within each science, and aiming to ensure logical coherence amongst them, under the rule of the supreme evolution-principle.

According to Mihai Șora’s theory/philosophical stance, every inquiry into the relation between phenomenology and metaphysics must start first from the clarification of the notions of existence and in-sistence. If, according to the existentialist phenomenology, existence sends to the fact of being situated in the exterior of your inner self (as Heidegger would put it that is being thrown out ahead in your existential projects), in-sistence is, in Șora’s view, a way of being centered upon yourself, i.e. lying entirely in your own self. For Heidegger, the essence of the Dassein consists in the Dassein’s existence. For Șora, the integral existential project of man, being made of the man’s totality of existential acts, does not come out from the mode of existence (as interpreted by Heidegger), but rather resides in the in-sistence’s mode. The passage from existence to in-sistence marks here a leap from phenomenology to a sort of metaphysics which nonetheless does not cancel out the phenomenological inquiry, but rather attempts at integrating the latter in a broader and more comprehensive theory of being and grounding. The result of this analysis would be that phenomenology and metaphysics are in truth two complementary domains, and not two opposed approaches in philosophy.

The Romanian philosopher Ion Petrovici deals in his last study sent for publication during his life with the comparative analysis of “the philosophical spirit”, “the scientific spirit”, and “the theological spirit”. Censorship removed considerations on “the theological spirit”. Petrovici characterizes “the philosophical spirit” by the overall perspective it seeks and by its role in relation to scientific research. It also distinguishes between “philosophical spirit” and philosophical doctrine. Finally, the similarities and differences between “the scientific spirit” and “the philosophical spirit” are analysed.

The PhD dissertation defended by Ion Petrovici in 1905 triggered criticism related to its sources, method and aim. Although the author made use of the term ‘psychophysical parallelism’ in the title – the critics reproached –, the work had nothing to do with scientific psychology. The following paper discusses the distinction between psychophysical parallelism as description and psychophysical parallelism as solution to the mind–body problem. Only the former can be considered a proper scientific approach.

In a conference held at Sorbonne on March 25, 1936, “La connaissance humaine et le transcendent” (Human knowledge and the transcendent), Ion Petrovici discussed the following problem which he traced through the history of philosophy to the present day: Is thought capable of perceiving reality itself? He distinguished between the gnoseological and ontological aspects of the problem. The first one is related to the nature and capacity of human functions (sensation, perception, intellect, reason) to intuit and render reality in knowledge. The second one belongs to the very structure of reality, of the object of knowledge. Fundamental categories of Kant’s philosophy, such as existence, causality, and substance are brought into discussion. Provocative, but often puzzling, is that, from whatever field we start, we quickly reach a result that has an almost apodictic meaning: thinking always aims beyond itself.

The paper tries to identify the imperfections of a small book review from 1920, which had a disproportionate impact on subsequent Romanian philosophical historiography. The review in question is signed by Petre Andrei; he points to a parallel between certain novel ideas of the logicians Ion Petrovici and Edmond Goblot, drawing attention to the complete similarity of their conceptions and the priority that the former would have over the latter regarding their thoughts on the relationship between the intension and the extension of logical concepts. But the ideas were not so novel, the similarity was not so complete, and the priority did not exist, or at least this is what I will try to establish.

The purpose of this text is to emphasize the positioning – on account of the use of the term ‘truth’ – of philosophy, respectively theology concerning the metaphysical principle. I sketch an interpretative grid that I apply, as an illustration, to the uses of the term ‘truth’ in the theory of knowledge of Ion Petrovici and Alexandru Mironescu. At stake in the investigation is to reveal the difficulty that a person with both philosophical and theological commitments about the principle must face.

In the following paper, Ion Petrovici’s concept of metaphysics is taken into consideration. Starting from the debates on metaphysics that were at their peak at the beginning of the last century, the present paper explores the possibility of a metaphysical approach from the point of view of a categorial thinking while emphasizing on the relationship between metaphysics and religion. In Petrovici’s view, metaphysics is an expression of a tendency of the soul, as well as of a need for absolute truth – expression that aims at a practicality intrinsic to the discourse. The metaphysics as science becomes therefore a metaphysics of consolation that seeks the meaning of Being and eternity at the expense of the factual truth. In the end, the relationship between scientific and metaphysical progress will be addressed.

The following essay is an approach of Noica’s ontology considered as “weak thought” (Gianni Vattimo). In the first section of the paper, I will clarify the concept of “weak thought” and I will argue for an alternative Romanian term designed to replace “weak”. In the second section I will examine the extent to which Noica’s ontology can be read as a weak ontology. 

The article discusses new unpublished documents which supplement those presented in the earlier articles published in this journal (the issues VIII, IX and X). Appendix 1 contains seven new pieces belonging to the correspondence of I. P. Culianu with Mac Linscott Ricketts. In order to further contextualise them I have added a contemporary exchange between Ricketts and Joseph M. Kitagawa, along with Kitagawa’s unpublished review of Ricketts’ monograph about Mircea Eliade (appendices 3 and 5). Appendix 2 adds three new pieces to the correspondence of I. P. Culianu with Mircea and Christinel Eliade. Again, for a better contextualisation and understanding of them, I added the exchanges of Fernand Schwarz with Mircea and Christinel Eliade (appendix 4). In most of these documents, the main topic of interest for the discussion carried on in the article is Culianu’s attitude towards the accusations of philo-Fascism and anti-Semitism brought to Mircea Eliade.