Colocviul Național „Ion Petrovici – 50” (10 iunie 2022, 10–15.30). Program

In this paper, I propose an interpretation of Petrovici’s philosophy and Ponty’s philosophy, both of them structured in accordance with the concept of unity of existence (the world), itself given in a close relation with the idea about an existential subject. Each philosophy includes a representation of the unity of existence, founded, the first, in a spiritual conviction (noetic belief), and the second, in a perceptual faith. This representation is at the same time a privileged kind by which a subject enters the world. Also, I will propose arguments in order to legitimate the idea that each representation and its construction let themselves be led by the regulativity of a model of philosophizing: the philosophy of life (in the context of a metaphysics) – Petrovici; the existential philosophy (in a phenomenological context) – Ponty.

Keywords: noetic belief; perceptual faith; representation (of real-world unity); transcendence; lived world; Petrovici; Merleau-Ponty.

The Romanian philosopher Ion Petrovici deals in his last study sent for publication during his life with the comparative analysis of “the philosophical spirit”, “the scientific spirit” and “the theological spirit”. Censorship removed considerations about “the theological spirit”. Petrovici characterizes “the philosophical spirit” by the overall perspective it seeks and by its role in relation to scientific research. He also distinguishes between “philosophical spirit” and philosophical doctrine. Finally, the similarities and differences between “the scientific spirit” and “the philosophical spirit” are analyzed.

Keywords: “philosophical spirit”; “scientific spirit”; philosophical doctrine; speculative thinking; method of science.

The principle of uncertainty formulated by German physicist Werner Heisenberg in 1927 produced a stir in the scientific and philosophical world of the twentieth century, shaking the confidence in the value of determinism, causality, and definite foresight.

Ion Petrovici referred to this issue in a communication to the Romanian Academy in 1938. On this occasion he was in a polemical position towards the Romanian mathematician Vasile Vâlcovici who, in a similar communication, also at the Romanian Academy, was of the opinion that determinism is an easy-to-reject conception, as well as towards the British astrophysicist Arthur Eddington, who saw in the crisis of determinism a triumph of religious faith.

Disproving the initiative of an indeterministic epistemology, Petrovici pays attention to the reformulations of the principle of causal determinism (such as that of the German philosopher Hermann Lotze) and joins the optimistic points of view expressed by prestigious scientists at the 9^th International Congress of Philosophy in Paris (1937) on overcoming the crisis of determinism.

Moreover, Petrovici asserts his confidence that the stringency of determinism will not be able to be banished on a secondary level but will be preserved in a form as refined and ethereal even in the world of supreme sources, indicating that even in transcendent regions it is not possible to ignore the deterministic vision without the risk of total darkness. As a final argument against those who proclaim indeterminism, Petrovici argues that they do not assert dogmatically their beliefs but strive to discuss the causes that led them to adhere to indeterminism.

Keywords:  the principle of uncertainty; determinism; causality; prediction; a priori.

The purpose of this text is to emphasize the positioning – on account of the use of the term ‘truth’ – of philosophy, respectively theology concerning the metaphysical principle. I sketch an interpretative grid that I apply, as an illustration, to the uses of the term ‘truth’ in the theory of knowledge of Ion Petrovici and Alexandru Mironescu. At stake in the investigation is to reveal the difficulty that a person with both philosophical and theological commitments about the principle must face.

Keywords: philosophy; theology; knowledge; metaphysical principle; truth.

The PhD dissertation defended by Ion Petrovici in 1905 triggered criticism related to its sources, method and aim. Although the author made use of the term ‘psychophysical parallelism’ in the title – the critics reproached –, the work had nothing to do with scientific psychology. The following paper discusses the distinction between psychophysical parallelism as method and psychophysical parallelism as an explanation to the mind–body problem. Only the former can be considered a proper scientific approach.

Keywords: rational psychology vs. scientific psychology; mind–body problem; identity hypothesis; Titu Maiorescu; C. Rădulescu-Motru.

The Romanian thinker Ion Petrovici (1882–1972) was constantly concerned about the analysis and theoretisation of the philosophy–science relationship (especially in the version of the relationship between metaphysics and natural sciences). In this respect, almost all his works, be they articles, studies, essays, author volumes, etc., cover this problematic area. Its approaches are of particular complexity and finesse, combining historical and epistemological analyses with ontological-metaphysical ones, without neglecting the fields of art, religion, morals, etc. We intend to examine some of these explorations by Petrovici, full of interesting personal contributions on the theoretical-methodological level (e.g. the issue of metaphysical legitimacy, the problem of the method in metaphysics, as well as the aspects of the relationship of metaphysics with science), which tend towards balanced, complex and fruitful solutions. We will also report these contributions to similar elaborations of some of his famous contemporaries (Lucian Blaga and Dumitru D. Rosca), to which they present, in some places, a continuity less surprised by commentators so far. In our opinion, Petrovici’s argument, as a whole, is made for a holist-synthetic conception of the great forms of spiritual culture (philosophy, science, art, religion, moral), which he strives to argue despite the differences in historical and systematic doctrinal conjuncture.

Keywords: Ion Petrovici; philosophy; science; knowledge; system; method.

Chiar dacă studiile despre filosofia kantiană și cele de logică sunt cele mai cunoscute contribuții ale lui Ion Petrovici, perspectiva asupra gândirii filosofice și științifice trebuie extinsă printr-o aborare holistă a contextului filosofic și științific în care acesta s-a format și a creat. Cele două prelegeri sunt reprezentative din acest punct de vedere. Pentru J. F. Herbart, recunoaște importanța acestuia în domeniul educației prin contribuțiile promotorilor pedagogiei herbartiene, precum și durata aplicării acestora în România. În ceea ce îl privește pe W. Wundt, dincolo de experiența formativă prin audierea cursurilor acestuia la Universitatea din Leipzig, subliniază sensurile potrivite pentru înțelegerea activității științifice și operei acestuia, în special a lucrării Völkerpsychologie. Extinzând limitele acestor sisteme în trecut, până la Leibniz, și apoi până în prezent, luând în considerare și contribuțiile studenților americani care s-au pregătit cu Wundt, observăm că multe concepte au fost reconfigurate, extinse și aplicate în funcție de noile dezvoltări științifice, teoretice și tehnologice – și revin în practică și actualitate și acolo unde la un moment dat au ajuns să fie considerate  obsolete. Un caz este cel al apercepției, iar modele instrucționale precum învățarea activă și învățarea fuzionată (blended learning) își pierd originea în încercările herbartiene. Un exeget al operei lui Wundt afirmă că conceptul de cogniție este o încercare de înlocuire a apercepției, iar modelul sistemului de procesare centralizată a informației nu este atât de vast precum construcția teoretică a lui Wundt (conform lui Jochen Fahrenberg). Cert este că  la aceste prelegeri contribuțiile și literatura filosofică din România – fie că este vorba de istorii ale filosofiei românești și universale (moderne, contemporane), exegeze și interpretări, traduceri – au făcut un progres deosebit, ceea ce permite extinderea câmpului de înțelegere și interpretare. Pe de altă parte, digitalizarea prin facilitarea accesului la opere și materiale din domeniul public ajută la înțelegerea adecvată și contextuală în vederea valorificării acestor modele practice într-un mod relevant pentru cultura și societatea noastră.

Cuvinte-cheie: apercepție; învățare activă; învățare fuzionată; cogniție.

An ardent supporter of traditionalist metaphysics and the reconciliation of philosophy with science and religion, in order to substantiate real philosophical knowledge, Ion Petrovici pleaded in his writings for the use of both the empirical-rationalist and the intuitionist method. Extremely favorable, N. Bagdasar’s commentary on „The History of Romanian Philosophy” (1940) objectively describes, the philosopher’s courageous attempts, carried out at the height of logical positivism, to legitimize metaphysics. But this attitude is not to be found anymore after the war, in the conditions of the new political rules imposed in the country during the „era” of communist totalitarianism, when his philosophical writings are marginalized or, when commented, they are framed in the „decadent” currents of spiritualist orientation. It was only after 1990, that some authors of syntheses, compendia, monographs and histories of Romanian philosophy (Gheorghe Vlăduţescu, Alexandru Surdu, Ion Ianoşi, Al. Boboc, Vasile Muscă, Angela Botez, Viorel Vizureanu etc.), restore the proper interpretation of Ion Petrovici’s work, giving it due importance and placing the philosopher among Maiorescu  disciples , with valuable philosophical contributions especially in logic (obtaining and the nature of notions, their sphere and content etc.), in metaphysics and in the theory of knowledge.

Keywords: theory of notions; psycho-physical parallelism; critical realism; N. Bagdasar, History of Romanian philosophy.

In the following paper, Ion Petrovici’s concept of metaphysics is taken into consideration. Starting from the debates on metaphysics that were at their peak at the beginning of the last century, the present paper explores the possibility of a metaphysical approach from the point of view of a categorial thinking while emphasizing on the relationship between metaphysics and religion. In Petrovici’s view, metaphysics is an expression of a tendency of the soul, as well as of a need for absolute truth – expression that aims at a practicality intrinsic to the discourse. The metaphysics as science becomes therefore a metaphysics of consolation that seeks the meaning of Being and eternity at the expense of the factual truth. In the end, the relationship between scientific and metaphysical progress will be addressed.

Cuvinte-cheie: metaphysics; tendency of the soul; progress; truth; categorial think­ing; metaphysics of consolation. 

In a conference held at Sorbonne on March 25, 1936, “La connaissance humaine et le transcendent” (Human knowledge and the transcendent), Ion Petrovici discussed the following problem which he traced through the history of philosophy to the present day: Is thought capable of perceiving reality itself? He distinguished between the gnoseological and ontological aspects of the problem. The first one is related to the nature and capacity of human functions (sensation, perception, intellect, reason) to intuit and render reality in knowledge. The second one belongs to the very structure of reality, of the object of knowledge. Fundamental categories of Kant’s philosophy, such as existence, causality, and substance are brought into discussion. Provocative, but often puzzling, is that, from whatever field we start, we quickly reach a result that has an almost apodictic meaning: thinking always aims beyond itself.

Keywords: reality; appearance; truth; essence; knowledge; metaphysics vs. science.

The paper tries to identify the imperfections of a small book review from 1920, which had a disproportionate impact on subsequent Romanian philosophical historiography. The review in question is signed by Petre Andrei; he points to a parallel between certain novel ideas of the logicians Ion Petrovici and Edmond Goblot, drawing attention to the complete similarity of their conceptions and the priority that the former would have over the latter regarding their thoughts on the relationship between the intension and the extension of logical concepts. But the ideas were not so novel, the similarity was not so complete, and the priority did not exist, or at least this is what I will try to establish.

Keywords: law of inverse variation of extension and intension; connotation; comprehension; concept; idea; static and dynamic perspectives; historical priority; Petre Andrei; Ion Petrovici; Edmond Goblot.